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Figures of Deterrence
in Late Imperial China.
Frequency, Spatial Repartition, and Types of Crimes Targeted
by Dismemberment under the Qing Dynasty
Jérôme Bourgon1
Julie Erismann
(Institut  d’Asie Orientale/ENS de Lyon, France)
Quoique  l’empire  chinois ait employé un système de codification juridique 
sophistiqué pendant des siècles, on a très rarement tenté  d’en mesurer  l’impact 
sur la société. La numérisation offre la possibilité de collecter des données 
à une échelle suffisante pour évaluer les pratiques pénales. Cette recherche 
 constitue  l’esquisse de recherches futures, et se limite aux exécutions par 
démembrement (lingchi), forme la plus dissuasive de la peine de mort, car elle 
est la mieux documentée et la plus aisée à retrouver dans les archives. Une 
base de données  d’environ 1 140 sentences de lingchi exécutées sur environ 
260 ans sous la dynastie des Qing permet  l’examen statistique de la fréquence, 
de  l’évolution dans le temps, de la répartition géographique et de la nature 
des crimes  concernés. Initialement, cette peine visait les crimes  contre  l’État 
tels que la rébellion ou le brigandage, mais nos données montrent que le 
lingchi fut employé de manière croissante pour  conforter la hiérarchie interne 
à la famille, en visant les enfants indignes et les épouses meurtrières. Plutôt 
que  l’arme rudimentaire servant à écraser les soulèvements souvent décrite 
par les historiens, le lingchi  constituait un dispositif sophistiqué de soutien 
 d’un projet  confucéen  complexe. 
Although the Chinese empire applied a sophisticated codified legal system 
for centuries, very few attempts have been made to measure its impact on 
society. Digitization now provide for data to be collected on a scale wide 
enough to allow assessment on how the penal system operated in practice. 
As a blueprint for further research, the scope of the present study is limited to 
the executions by dismemberment (lingchi), the most deterrent form of death 
penalty, as it is the best-documented and easiest to find in the archives. A 
1 After studying and passing grades in history departments, Jérôme Bourgon specialized in Chinese his-
tory. In 1994, he defended his Ph.D thesis in ‘History and Civilization’ at the EHESS, with a study of 
Shen Jiaben, who introduced Western law in late imperial China and was the last jurist and historian 
of the Chinese legal tradition. Hereafter, Bourgon researched various aspects of Chinese law, such 
as the questionable relationship between ‘customs’ and civil law, the various genres of legal books 
in imperial China, and penal law as seen through the ominous ‘Supplice  chinois’ [http ://turandot. 
chineselegalculture.org/]. He published two books on this topic. Since 2011, he leads an international 
project aimed at a  complete and accurate translation of the Qing dynasty penal code, as well as a new 
understanding of law through its differentiated implementation on the various parts of the empire ter-
ritory, hence its title “Legalizing Space in China” [http ://lsc. chineselegalculture.org/]. He is currently 
writing a general history of penal law in China, in which this study on lingchi takes place.
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data-set of around 1,140 lingchi sentences executed over 260 years under 
the Qing dynasty provides the statistical basis for examining the frequency of 
this punishment, as well as its evolution over time, its repartition across the 
territory, and the nature of the crimes targeted. While the original purpose 
of this penalty was to deter crimes against the State, such as rebellions or 
banditry, our data show that lingchi was increasingly employed to strengthen 
the hierarchy within the family by primarily targeting unfilial  children and 
murderous wives. Instead of being the rudimentary instrument to crush 
social upheavals, as claimed by many historians, lingchi functioned as a 
sophisticated device to maintain a  complex Confucian agenda.
INTRODUCTION
Numbers are rare in Chinese history, which forces China historians to rely on empiricism and rule of thumb. It may seem that legal history is less hampered 
by the shortage of quantitative data than economic or social history, since there are 
plenty of codes and casebooks to explore. Yet evaluating the efficiency of the legal 
system in general, or the implementation of death penalty and its deterring effect on 
the Chinese populace, the lack of reliable figures becomes a serious obstacle.
As far as we know, there have been only two attempts from historians of China 
to treat crime and punishment statistically. Both rely on the xingke tiben, the 
routine memorials written by the provincial governors presenting cases of capital 
sentencing from their jurisdictions to the Board of Punishment. These documents 
were ultimately registered by a bureau of the Censorate specialized in penal matters 
(xingke), and  conserved in the Grand Secretariat archives. In 1990, James Lee used 
copies of xingke tiben available at the Utah genealogical society to establish a first 
survey of 22,000 capital cases transmitted by four provinces (out of eighteen)2. With 
a yearly average of 2,000 to 3,000 death penalties submitted to the Assizes, only a 
minority, fluctuating between 12 and 40%, were executed. The system deliberately 
made executions uncertain, in order to enhance the role of the imperial mercy. Such 
uncertainty, added to the unevenness of recording throughout the provinces of the 
great empire, makes any general assessment challenging.3 In his innovative book, 
Thomas Buoye focused on 385 homicide cases caused by dispute over land and debt 
in the Guangdong province during the second half of the 18th century.4 Relying on 
 Lee’s figures for the rest of China as a point of reference, Buoye subtly analyzed the 
social and economic causes of dispute leading to increases in homicide rates. These 
two pioneering studies regard judicial archives as documents for social history, and 
are interested in crime and punishment as indicators of social  conflicts. They are 
specifically  concerned about the gap between statistics and the elusive reality, the 
notorious ‘dark figure of crime’.5
This article is less  concerned with ‘social realities’ than with the nature and 
significance of punishments. What we search in figures of executions are not so 
much reflections of social  conflicts than messages from the State about proper social 
2 Lee (1991).
3 Lee (1991, p. 124).
4 Buoye (2000).
5 Lee (1991, pp. 116-117), Buoye (2000, pp. 238-239).
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behavior. Ultimately, we aim at assessing the human cost of crime deterrence, in 
order to assess whether deterrence was efficient in preventing violence, or whether 
the remedy was worse than the evil. Whereas Lee and Buoye dealt with the legal 
definition of crimes as a distortion of the true criminality, we focus on the penal 
agenda of the State in its  conceptualisation of crime and staging of punishment, as 
well as the dogmatic canonical background. This opens for a new set of questions : 
Were punishments correctly  conceived, and did they reach the targeted objective ? 
Or did they go in a different direction, and turned counterproductive in relation to the 
values they claimed to defend ? Such dogmatic issues cannot be studied in fragments 
through provincial or periodical samples ; they require general evaluation on the 
scale of the whole empire, and for the whole Qing era. Admittedly, such objective is 
far beyond our current documentation and capacity of treatment. As a way to remove 
the obstacle, this article proposes a short-cut, by bringing together the growing part of 
the Qing archives that are now easily accessible through digitization. It has become 
possible to get what Pierre Chaunu called a “pesée globale”, a “ comprehensive 
weighing”, of crimes and punishments as social practice.6 As approximate and 
incidentally flawed it may be, this  comprehensive assessment raises issues that 
would not be apparent in a more limited and fragmented study. As such, we hope to 
open new field of reflection on law and crime in China.
WHY FOCUS ON LINGCHI EXECUTIONS ?
This paper focuses on executions by dismemberment, lingchi chusi in Chinese, 
which are more  commonly known by the expression “death by a thousand cuts”. In 
reality the practice involved no more than eight to ten cuts. Why focus on lingchi, 
that  constituted the most extreme form of deterrence in the Qing penal system ? As 
the harshest form of death penalty, it was assured the highest degree of visibility as 
well as certainty, due to its exclusion from the judicial revision process. Like other 
crimes, lingchi sentences were systematically  conveyed through memorials drawn 
up by the provincial judge (ancha shi) on behalf of the provincial governor under 
whose authority cases were investigated, processed and submitted to the Board of 
Punishments in Beijing. Crimes  committed in the Beijing metropolitan area were 
adjudicated directly by the Board of Punishment in a procedure called “immediate 
adjudication” (xianshen). Once examined by the specialized services of the Board, 
the cases were assigned to the “Three Legal Courts” (Sanfasi)  composed by the 
directorates of the Board of Punishments, the Censorate (Duchayuan), and the Court 
of Revision (Dalisi). Lingchi sentences were then transmitted to the emperor for 
 confirmation by the emperor, like all capital sentences.
This judicial process was somewhat perfunctory, however, since lingchi was not 
an ordinary death penalty, it did not appear among the “Five Punishments”, the list 
of legal penalties in Article One of the Chinese penal codes, which had been in force 
since the Tang. The Fifth and most serious penalty was subdivided into “death by 
strangulation”, supposedly a milder form of execution because it left the body in its 
integrity, and “decapitation”, more severe since “head and body were separated” 
(shenshou yichu). While the Chinese legal system was based on the principle that 
6 Chaunu (1968).
52 JÉRÔME BOURGON
the nature of crimes and punishments must be clearly and publicly defined and 
announced, so that people would be deterred from  committing crime, the absence of 
the harshest punishment of all in the list of the legal penalties is intriguing. It makes 
dismemberment a terse and duplicitous device of deterrence. 
Lingchi was peculiar in another respect which was hidden in the depth of the code. 
In various sections, death penalty was allowed in order to fit itemized crimes, each time 
specifying whether the sentence required “immediate execution” (lijue), or whether, 
as in most cases, extenuating circumstances justified preventive “detainment in jail” 
(jianhou), meaning that the death sentence was suspended until its reexamination 
by the Autumn Assises. This procedure effectively reduced executions to a small 
number of “ confirmed sentences”, while most death sentence were finally  commuted 
to banishment or pardon. These broadly dispensed mitigations were welcome in a 
harsh legal system, but lingchi  completely derogated from them. The few articles 
of the code that mention this penalty – the detail of which will be examined below 
– always implied “immediate execution”. Accordingly, lingchi sentences were 
excluded from the revision procedure of the Autumn Assizes. Introduced in the code 
by the  conquering Mongols who established the Yuan dynasty, lingchi was originally 
intended as a sheer instrument of terror, and it remained so both under the Chinese 
Ming dynasty and the Manchu Qing dynasty. Its application therefore had to remain 
outside the boundaries of mercy and pardon, although the latter was quite generously 
dispensed in the penal system as a whole.
In addition, legal provisions could be circumvented to make the execution more 
“immediate”. Prior to its legalization and codification by the Mongols, lingchi 
had started as an expeditious device against rebellions, and these shady origins 
resurfaced in the procedural shortcuts which were at the disposal of provincial 
governors. Indeed, a significant number of lingchi were meted out through a speedy 
process, reverently dubbed : “Respectfully requiring a sovereign order” (gongqing 
wangming). In practice this meant that the provincial governor had already proceeded 
to the execution, and requested a post-facto imperial rescript to give this arbitrary 
execution an appearance of legality.7 
This plethora of derogations deprived the accused of the due process which was 
normally guaranteed by the revision system. This is undoubtedly the evil face of the 
imperial legal system, reserving in many respects a sphere for extra-legal measures 
and draconian justice where legal procedures were systematically distorted or 
ignored. Although a curse for the population, the lingchi penalty and its procedures 
are a blessing for the statistician, who can assume that all identified lingchi sentences 
were executed with very few exceptions. For this particular punishment sentence 
meant execution, with only a negligible margin of discrepancy.
Another advantage of lingchi for historical enquiry  comes from the formal nature 
of the memorials sent by the provincial authorities to the central boards. These 
reports mostly  consisted of the lists of  convicted persons, categorized according 
to the sentences they received. Only those who were ‘short listed’ were named, 
while the others were left unnamed under the character “deng”, meaning etc., et 
alii. For instance : “Condemned to immediate decapitation are Wang X, Zhang Y, 
and 18 others”. Lingchi  condemnations were judged serious enough to be presented 
separately in a single memorial, where each individual was identified by name with 
7 On this swift procedure of execution, see Suzuki (2003).
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the crime he or she had  committed. Whenever lingchi sentences were mentioned in a 
routine memorial including several different types of penalties, lingchi sentences were 
placed at the top of the list. In group executions of rebels or bandits, the ringleader 
was usually  condemned to lingchi and his full name was used to identify the case, 
while his subordinates who were  condemned to decapitation were mentioned only 
cursorily by the et alii stock designation.
This  conspicuousness has allowed the identification of a significant sample of 
over 1100 lingchi sentences executed between the Qing  conquest in 1644 and the 
abolition of lingchi and other ‘cruel penalties’ in 1905. This set of cases is briefly 
described below and more details are provided in the appendix.
COMMON ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT LINGCHI AND THE ISSUES THEY RAISE
My first encounter with lingchi execution was in Bodde and Morris’ Law in 
Imperial China, the textbook wherein many legal historians of China learned the 
ropes.8 In this book, the description of the Qing legal system ends with a section 
headed “Western glimpses of Chinese punishments”, describing the cases selected, 
the authors explain, “because of their seeming accuracy and objectivity, as well as 
detail”.9 The most memorable, for most readers, is the long and minutely detailed 
description of a series of decapitations of bandits, ending with the dismemberment 
of their ringleader, witnessed by Thomas T. Meadows, a Senior Officer at the British 
Consulate in Canton in the 1850s. Cherished among Sinologists for the perceptiveness 
and reliability of his views on the Qing administration, he is also known for his pleas 
for British support to the Taiping rebellion, although his efforts were to no avail. He 
wrote two books on Qing China. In one he included what remains the only accurate 
eyewitness account of execution by dismemberment. Here is a description of the 
dismemberment of the ring leader :
As soon as the thirty-three were decapitated, the same executioner proceeded, 
with a single-edged dagger or knife, to cut up the man on the cross, whose sole 
clothing  consisted of his wide trousers, rolled down to his hips and up to his 
buttocks. He was a strongly-made man, above the middle-size, and apparently 
about forty years of age. (…) As the man was at the distance of twenty-five yards, 
with his side towards us, though we observed the two cuts across the forehead, the 
cutting off of the left breast, and slicing of the flesh from the front of the thighs, 
we could not see all the horrible operation. From the first stroke of the knife till 
the moment the body was cut down from the cross and decapitated, about four 
or five minutes elapsed. We should not have been prohibited from going close 
up, but as may be easily imagined, even a powerful curiosity was an insufficient 
inducement, to jump over a number of dead bodies and literally wade through 
pools of blood, to place ourselves in the hearing of the groans indicated by the 
heaving chest and quivering limbs of the poor man. Where we stood, we heard 
not a single cry ; and I may add that of the thirty-three men decapitated, no one 
struggled or uttered any exclamation as the executioner approached him.10
 8 Bodde, Morris, (1973).
 9 Bodde, Morris (1973, p. 112, n.51).
10 Meadows (1856, pp. 655-656). Quoted in Bodde, Morris (1973).
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The impact of this breathtaking rendition is put into  context by Bodde and Morris 
who stressed the exceptionality of the event :
The fact that these accounts from north, central and south China have to do with 
events occurring respectively in 1860, 1857, and 1851 is important because all 
three dates fall within the period of the Taiping rebellion (1850-1864). This 
 conflict, probably the most destructive civil war of all time, devastated much of 
the richest land of China, killed twenty or more millions people, and very nearly 
overthrew the Manchu government. These then were years of crisis, very different 
indeed from the period only thirty or forty years earlier to which the bulk of the 
cases translated in this book belong. Hence it may be not wholly fair to project 
what is said about penal institutions during the one age back to the earlier age of 
political stability.11
These few lines raise a lot of questions. First, why rely on “Western glimpses”, 
why not  compare them with Chinese accounts ? The answer is that there are no 
such accounts. As curious as it might seem, no substantial account of a lingchi 
execution from a Chinese writer can be found for the whole Qing period ; Chinese 
literati did not write about such things.12 More importantly, to what extent are these 
accounts by Meadows and other Westerners representative of Chinese Law under 
the Qing ? The italicized passages above hint that the shocking aspects of repression 
and deterrence were due to the extraordinary  conditions that faced the Qing State 
at that time, such that “it would not be wholly fair to project to the earlier age of 
political stability”. There is no reason to challenge this judgment in general, nor to 
deny the depth of the mid-19th century crisis caused by the Taiping rebellion and 
other  contemporary uprisings as well as their tremendous impact on the Qing state 
and Chinese population. A naïve reader of Bodde and Morris may infer from their 
 comment that dismemberment and other deterring devices were extreme measures 
employed mainly during an age of turmoil, in sharp departure from the normal 
course of justice in the heyday of the Qing.
Hence the question that underlies this article : to what extent is  Meadows’s 
account of a  bandit’s execution by dismemberment and beheading representative 
of Chinese law under the Qing ? Was lingchi a tool of deterrence used in periods 
of exceptional turmoil, which significantly receded in peaceful times ? An implicit 
assumption by Bodde and Morris is that lingchi was mainly employed against 
rebellions and gangs of violent bandits. In another part of their book the authors 
provide a  complete list of the crimes that were punished by lingchi. Nevertheless it 
is clear that in their view this punishment was primarily a technique of mass terror 
intended for reestablishing State authority and public law and order disrupted by 
revolts and armed banditry. Other crimes punishable by dismemberment, such as 
murders of elder relatives, bloody feuds between families or lineages, are deemed 
marginal and anecdotal  compared with the major disruptions of the public order. 
Must we regard this kind of executions primarily as a tool of political terror used by 
the State against society ?
11 Bodde, Morris (1973, p. 111) – (my italics).
12 For reflections on this silence, see Bourgon (2007) ; Brook, Bourgon, Blue (2008, chapter 1). The 
short eyewitness report of Wang  Weiqin’s execution by the hydraulic engineer Li Yizhi evoked in this 
chapter does not make a real exception, since Li depicts the arrival of the  condemned, the place and 
the crowd, but has not a word about the actual execution.
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Our data gives insight on the following five issues :
1) Frequency : how many lingchi executions took place during the 261 years 
between the Qing  conquest in 1644 and the abolition of the ‘cruel penalties’ 
in 1905 ?
2) Trend : do we discern an upwards or downwards trend in the use of lingchi 
during the Qing period ?
3) Periodization : were there periods which saw an abrupt increase or decrease 
in lingchi executions ? Were some Qing Emperors more prone than others to 
authorizing ‘slicing’ executions ?
4) Localization : were lingchi executions spread evenly throughout the empire, 
or did some provinces or regions witness the executions more frequently than 
others ?
5) Dissuasion target : Among the few major crimes for which the code provided 
for a lingchi sentence, which crimes were most frequently subject to linchi 
execution ? Were there significant changes across provinces and time ? Were 
certain types of crimes more targeted or repressed in particular provinces, or 
during particular periods ?
PROBLEMS AND POTENTIAL OF THE COLLECTED DATA
We have gathered a sample of 1,140 persons killed by the lingchi process across 
1,017 executions. The discrepancy between the two figures results from the fact that 
several dismemberments could take place in the same execution, as the dramatic 
case of the Monk Snowfield and his followers will show. Let us start by presenting 
our source (for further details see appendix 1).
Our two major sources are the “Archives of the Grand Secrétariat” (neige daku 
 dang’an) and the judicial chronicles in the Shenbao which reproduced the “Beijing 
gazette” (jingbao). The archives preserve the record of 357 persons dismembered 
in 338 executions between 1644 and 1854 ; the Shenbao supplies us with the record 
of 453 persons dismembered in 453 executions. This makes up the first sample of 
810 lingchi, a good basis for our enquiry, but it presents two vexing flaws. First, 
the periods covered by each source are grossly unequal in length : 210 years for the 
archival source versus 33 years for the newspaper source. Moreover, the eighteen 
years from the last year of the archival source, 1854, to the first year of the journal 
source, 1872, are entirely devoid of data. As a matter of fact, the gap is wider, since 
the Grand secretariat archives show a sharp drop of executions from the early 1840s 
down to almost none in 1854. Given that these are the years of the high tide of 
lingchi and many other forms of violence caused by the Taiping, Nian, and Muslims 
rebellions, it is clear that these small numbers, or none at all, most likely reflect 
the disruption of the Qing administration rather than a real decrease in executions. 
During these thirty years, the rebels as well as the officials acted outside the law and 
off the record. Even though the lingchi sentences imposed on the Taiping leaders as 
well as on the  chiefs of other rebellions were recorded, most punishments occurred 
through summary “executions on the spot” (jiudi zhengfa) which were rarely 
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reported. The magnitude and lawlessness of violence for these two decades renders 
all judicial statistics unreliable.
Similar problems might negatively affect the data of previous periods. For 
instance, the Grand Secretariat records only 34 executions for the 60 years of 
reign of the Kangxi emperor, i.e. around 1.4 lingchi per year. The average is much 
lower if we  consider that a single collective execution held in 1667, that is, during 
Oboi Regency, counts for 27 lingchi, or 80% of the total number of the individuals 
executed. If we  consider the number of the executions, rather than the individuals, 
the number falls to eight, which is barely more than one every ten years. Either 
 Kangxi’s was the Grand lenient reign that admirers of imperial ‘légendes dorées’ like 
to venerate, or the data are flawed. Our inclination for the second view prompted us 
to  compensate the gap in time and flaws of data by referring to three  complementary 
sources. These are collections of administrative and judicial documents issued by 
State agents, either officially or unofficially (see appendix 1). Such sources allow 
raising the rate of executions under Kangxi to a more credible 3.9 per year. However, 
there are still spans of over ten years entirely “blank” of all executions under Kangxi 
or Yongzheng reigns, which lead us to suspect deficiencies in judicial registration. 
Resorting to  complementary sources could not  compensate for the sharp 
discrepancy between the last thirty years, corresponding exactly to the reign of 
Guangxu, and the rest of the Qing period. It simply allowed reducing the Guangxu 
share of the lingchi executions toll from 55% to 40%, but still a remarkably high 
proportion ; this question will be discussed later. The imbalance might result 
from the difference of coverage between the sources kept or issued by the central 
Qing administration, and the Shenbao, a modern newspaper that daily extracted 
information from the Beijing gazette as well as from other local reports thanks to 
an efficient network of correspondents. Hence a possible underestimation of the 
numbers prior to Guangxu, which only a systematic survey of the judicial archives 
in Beijing would be able to rectify.
Despite the problems indicated above, our two major sources provide for 
 complete and accurate information for over 1,100 lingchi sentences. We are 
provided with the name of the individuals  condemned to dismemberment, along 
with the names of their followers sentenced to decapitation ; the place where the 
crime was  committed ; the name or title of the official or the government services 
that supervised the execution at the provincial and central level (or both) ; and, less 
frequently, the local magistrate who started the investigation. Details or at least 
outlines of the cases are given, informing us of the nature of the crime, the reasons 
for the sentence in Chinese described as “the name of the crime” (zuiming). Finally, 
the gender of the criminal is normally specified except for a few cases. In brief, these 
are highly reliable execution registry and the executions most certainly took place 
except when the  condemned died in prison. Even in the latter cases, which are duly 
specified in the data, laws and practices usually  commanded that the  convict’s body 
be dismembered, so that they can also be counted as lingchi executions, even though 
their deterrent effect on the public is more questionable.13
The  complementary sources are less reliable. They  contain the name of the 
 condemned, the authorities that  confirmed the sentence, the “name of the crime”, 
13 The legal term in such case was not “putting to death by dismemberment” (lingchi chusi), but 
“slaughtering the corpse” (lushi), a nuance that we can ignore for the present purpose.
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and the date of sentencing. In around one hundred cases, however, the locality is not 
indicated, or even the province, where the case originated. We laid down as basic 
requirement for our samples that the case include the name of the  condemned, a clear 
statement of the sentence to lingchi, and the nature of the crime. On the whole, this 
set of samples is sound enough to attempt a “ comprehensive weighing” of lingchi 
executions under the Qing and to find answers to the five questions raised above.
FREQUENCY OF LINCHI SENTENCES
AND TRENDS THROUGHOUT THE QING PERIOD
The 1140 lingchi sentences pronounced between 1644 and 1905 produce an 
average of 4.5 executions per year. It amounts to 5.5 per year if we do not take 
into account 65 ‘blank years’ for which we suspect that the records have been lost. 
From the linear diagram (see b. in Appendix 2), we start with a low average under 
the Shunzhi, Kangxi and Yongzheng reigns, especially in the last two decades of 
the 17th century and the first three decades of the 18th when the number of lingchi is 
at its lowest. From the 1730s we observe an increase that  continues throughout the 
60 years reign of Qianlong. The upward trend picks up after 1770 and reaches its 
peak under Jiaqing during the first decade of the 19th century. Then, under Daoguang 
 comes a dramatic decrease ending with the ‘blank years’ in the 1860-1870s, which 
can be ascribed to the disruption of the judiciary caused by the huge rebellions of the 
mid-century. The mid-1870s saw the beginning of the noticeable rise which occurred 
in the Guangxu era : with more than thirteen per year, the average is ten times higher 
than in Kangxi era (four times if the ‘blank years’ are deducted), three times higher 
than in the Qianlong era. 439 executions over thirty years represent a little less 
than 40% of the total for the whole Qing era. Strikingly enough, by the time of the 
abolition, the number of executions was at its highest with 22 executions in 1904, 
which marks the second highest record year after 1883. Certainly, 1905 might have 
reached a new top if the abolishing decree had not brutally interrupted the rising trend 
in late April of that year.14 These changes are at odds with the expectations inferred 
from the European cases : in Europe the abolition of the “tormented executions” and 
judicial torture came after a long period of gradual decline, during which these kinds 
of practices were increasingly regarded as barbaric and backward. How are we to 
explain this discrepancy ?
The diagram shows a regular trend upward from the last years of Kangxi (after 
1700) to the reign of Jiaqing (1810). If, as we suspected, the trend downward 
that started during this era can be explained by the judicial breakdown, we can 
 compensate for the lack of data by  conjecturing a  continuation of the trend upward 
from the peak of the Jiaqing reign in 1806 to the peak of the early Guangxu reign. 
Since the gap in the diagram corresponds to the bloodiest years of the civil  conflict, 
when lingchi executions of the kind that Meadows witnessed took place in great 
numbers. It is reasonable to imagine even higher peaks under Xianfeng and Tongzhi 
– between 1850 and 1875 – than under Daoguang : thus the line would reach a peak 
around 1860, over twenty executions per year, which then would slightly decrease 
and remain at around fifteen per year under Guangxu.
14 On the abolition decrees of 1905, see Bourgon (2003, pp. 851-862).
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Even if we refrain from such bold statistical speculation, the general trend 
upward seems undeniable with the available data. At the present stage, it might 
be interpreted as a  confirmation of Bodde and Morris’ assumption of a growing 
recourse to lingchi as a reaction to the unprecedented civil  conflicts of the mid-19th 
century. The most suitable interpretation would be as follows : once the critical years 
of settlement under Shunzhi and the regencies of the early Kangxi reign passed, 
lingchi was seldom employed during most of the Kangxi and Yongzheng reigns, 
marking the acme of the dynasty. It was more frequently employed under Qianlong, 
whose reign was plagued by millenarian revolts and banditry during its last years. 
Then followed a troubled period during the early 19th century, mostly  concealed 
by the absence of archival data. Finally, once the State administration was restored 
and a better recording of judicial activities by the new media became available, 
the change appears dramatic : lingchi had become the unmistakable device of mass 
deterrence in a Chinese empire in general turmoil.
This interpretation seems coherent, but it relies on the idea that lingchi was mostly 
a tool for repressing rebellions and restoring ‘public order’. Conceptually, it places 
the dynamics of the evolution not so much in the law but rather in society which was 
marred by ethnic, social, and political  conflict. In such a perspective, lingchi is just a 
tool of repression in the hand of the State. The momentum is external to law, which 
reflects events passively : more rebellions to repress implies more lingchi sentences 
and executions. This paper will  contend that,  contrary to these interpretations, law is 
dynamic and creative : by determining what is criminal, it shapes the social reality 
in which the crimes take place. Far from a mere tool, lingchi was a  conception of 
society and power cast in a dogmatic mold and grounded in the most sacred Classics. 
The trend of sentences therefore had its own dynamics, relatively independent from 
the socio-political events, no matter how tremendous the impact of such events.
TARGETS OF DETERRENCE : CRIMES LIABLE OF LINGCHI
AND THEIR SHARE IN EFFECTIVE LINGCHI SENTENCES
Crimes subject to lingchi in the Qing code fall in the following categories :
1) Rebellions, high treason,  conspiracies (real or attempted) against the dynasty, 
and armed banditry. In analyzing the statistical and diagrammatical data, 
all the forms of collective actions that subverted or disrupted public order 
have been grouped under the same category of “Revolt”, marked by R in the 
diagrams of the appendix15 (see diagram c. and d. in appendix 2)
2) Killing three persons or more in another family. This was clearly a measure 
against family extermination, or “familicide”, that marked particularly 
15 Law against Robbery or banditry (“Qiangdao”, art.261 in the Qing code) did not provide for lingchi 
sentences, but only decapitation with immediate execution (zhan lijue), with possible exposure of the 
head (xiaoshou) for the ringleader. However, a gang of a certain magnitude in number and criminal 
records could be assimilated to a rebellious scheme, just like dissident groups for political or reli-
gious purposes. Our focus on State  conceptions and practices justifies the grouping under the single 
category of “Revolt” of what could be termed “crimes against the public order”. They generally fall 
under art.254 : “Plot of Rebellion and Great Sedition” (Moufan dani), and art.255 : “Plot of High 
Treason” (Moupan).
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vicious forms of blood feuds between lineages. These are the F crimes in the 
diagrams.16
3) Murder, attempted murder, or similar action, by a younger person on the elder 
person, or an inferior on the superior in the same family or clan. This is the 
general category of “parricides”, marked by P. This category can be split into 
5 sub-categories, according to whether the victim of the crime was the father 
(Pf), the mother (Pm), other close relatives (aunt, uncle, elder brother or sister 
all regrouped under the collective noun of zunzhang, that can be translated as 
“senior elder”, hence Pse in the diagrams) ; the killing of the household head 
(Phh) by a slave or hired domestic ; and the killing of the husband by his wife, 
which I propose to call viricide, as a Latin symmetric of uxoricide – marked 
Pv in the diagrams.17 
4) Inhuman crimes such as maiming and desecrating of the body of an enemy 
killed in a feud, or taking a body part of a living person for cannibalism or 
witchcraft (or both), have been ranged in the category of “atrocities” (A).18
These categories of crimes affect different realms, which can be regarded as 
 concentric circles. The first circle  concerns the public order of the empire, and the 
crimes in question have the potential for disrupting large areas or even the whole 
territory, as was the case of the massive rebellions of the mid-19th century. For 
crimes within this category, lingchi fulfills its ‘classical’ function of protecting the 
State and the dynasty. Crimes of the second category delineate a more restricted 
circle : a village or a district, the order of which could be disrupted by blood feuds 
between rivaling families engaged in ‘private wars’ or vendetta that affected local 
 communities in many parts of the empire. In this field, lingchi does not defend the 
State itself but local peace and order.
The third circle is the family, in its twofold legal definition : Firstly, as a 
household including the head of the family, all relatives living with him, slaves 
and hired servants. Secondly, as including all relatives linked by duties of ritual 
mourning, even those living separately. These two kinds of kinship – the existential 
one and the ritual one – were taken into account in the legal framing of a “parricide” 
sentence, thus  condemning to lingchi a domestic servant suspected of having plotted 
the death of the family head as well as a younger brother accused of having killed 
his elder brother even if living in separate dwellings. Moreover, a junior member 
of the family who killed a distant senior relative, for instance an aunt visiting his 
parents, was also liable of lingchi. Here, dismemberment was intended to maintain 
a strict subordination of the ‘younger junior’ (beiyou : those who were of a younger 
generation, or junior in age) vis-à-vis their senior or elder relatives (zunzhang : those 
relatives of an older generation, or elders of the same generation). This subordinate 
16 Art.287 : “Killing three persons in a same family” (Sha yijia sanren). The term “familicide” is cur-
rently used for crimes  committed by a spouse,  commonly the husband, killing the other spouse with 
the  children. But the term also includes the killing of a family by strangers, which is  common for our 
Chinese cases.
17 Art.284 : “Plot to kill grand-parents or parents” (Mousha zu fumu fumu) ; art.286 : “Plot to kill the par-
ents of  one’s deceased husband” ; art.314 : “Slave beating the household head” (Nubi ou jiazhang) ; 
art.315 : “Spouse or Concubine beating their husband” (Qie qi ou fu).
18 Art.287, last paragraph ; and art.288 : “Picking up parts of the body of a living person” (Zhaisheng 
zhege ren).
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status was for life : one remained the lifelong ‘younger junior’ of  one’s elder brother 
or sister, which changed only by the arrival of new members in the family who 
became  one’s ‘younger junior’.
The fourth circle is the most intriguing, since it delineates the individual body : 
death by dismemberment for desecrating the human body, either in the course of a 
vengeful feud or with the intent to use parts of the bodies for witchcraft or wicked 
sectarian  cults. Here, lingchi serves to defend a certain idea of human dignity, at least 
its bodily integrity. Despite the original significance and intentions behind making 
this a crime of lingchi, such cases became rare under the Qing, with most of them 
occurring at the height of blood feuds (see diagram c in appendix 2).
The underlying  connection between these four realms can be easily understood 
as a reflection of the relationship between the Empire or Universe, the family, and 
the Self which is at the foundation of the Chinese  conception of an orderly State. 
The ‘Great Study’ (Daxue), a Confucian Classic  compiled in the 4th century BC., 
established the nexus between self- cultivation, or the ability of the true Gentleman 
(Junzi) to govern himself, the ability to rule his family, and  consequently to govern 
and pacify the empire19. The same dialectic relationship between macrocosm and 
microcosm, with the familial hierarchy at its center as an epitome of the Filial Piety, 
reflects the Confucian cardinal virtue to unify the three realms, which permeates 
the whole range of lingchiable crimes. No matter how horrible a form of execution, 
and how legally questionable its status as a clearly codified penalty, and irrespective 
of the procedural shortcuts in its implementation, lingchi was perfectly in line with 
Confucian orthodoxy in its  conceptual background, suitable for the crimes that 
violated filial piety.
The four categories of crimes had their specific realms, so that their respective 
proportions are indicative of the main trend in the repression of the most heinous 
crimes. The code merely provides us with a theoretical definition of the most 
heinous crimes. To identify which of these crimes were most effectively repressed 
in practice, we need to turn toward the lingchi sentences pronounced by the judicial 
courts. The data allow for calculation of the share of each of the four categories of 
lingchi sentences, and for representing the figures in pie charts covering the reign 
of eight Qing emperors (see c. “Four categories of lingchi sentences for eight Qing 
emperors reigns” in the appendix).
Some structural characteristics become immediately apparent. Thus, the relative 
proportion of each category of crime during the reign of Shunzhi is strikingly 
similar to that of the reign of Guangxu, and to the intermediary reign of Daoguang. 
Condemnation for parricides represents around two thirds of the crimes, while the 
last third is shared between revolts and familicides : there are more revolts (30%) 
than familicides (7%) under Shunzhi (30% vs 7%) and also under Daoguang (22% 
vs 8%), but under Guangxu there are slightly more familicides than revolts (14 vs 
16%). During the long 18th century, under Yongzheng, Qianlong and Jiaqing rules, 
the occurrence of parricides remain under or around 50%, and revolts somewhere 
between 33 and 45%. The share of revolts tends to increase throughout the time, until 
the early 19th century. Finally, there are the anomalies of the Kangxi and Tongzhi 
19 This old classic may seem outdated in the Qing, but its meaning had been revived under the Ming, 
and placed at the core of the statecraft current by Qiu  Jun’s ‘Complement to the extended meaning of 
the Great Study’ (Daxue yanyi bu), which had a deep influence on Qing statecraft activists, such as 
Chen Hongmou. See Rowe (2001, p. 117).
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periods, during which revolts accounted for 94% of all crimes under Kangxi and 
100% of parricides under Tongzhi. This aberration, however, simply indicates that 
the data are flawed. Apart from parricides and revolts, familicides would require 
a special study : they remain stable between 7 and 9% for most of the period, and 
jump to 16% under Guangxu. Judicial archives as well as novels by popular authors, 
 confirm that familicides and their punishment with lingchi formed a basso  continuo 
of local life throughout the empire. They occasionally came with “atrocities” 
(maiming of bodies, dead or alive), which slowly declined from 4% to 2% of the 
sentences between the Qianlong and the Daoguang reigns, and disappear thereafter. 
Under the late-Qing, familicides became the most chronicled form of crime. 
Some famous cases offer fascinating examples of interconnection, if not  confusion, 
between reality and fiction, jurisprudence and gory tales. This is well illustrated by 
the historian of China, Jonathan Spence, who included a chapter in his best-selling 
Death of Woman Wang which mingled his description of a real case of “killing 
four people in the same family” with a novel of the popular early-Qing novelist Pu 
Songling.20A very similar case occurring in the late 18th century was turned into a 
popular novel by Wu Woyao a century later.21 This novel was published at the moment 
when a real case made the headlines, and recently established modern newspapers 
reported the investigations and the trial in a novelistic form, which adopted all the 
stereotyped characters known from fiction. This was a true case, however, which 
ended with the execution by lingchi of Wang Weiqin and the beheading of his 
elder son and four of his collaterals in October 1904.22 Fiction and real cases share 
stereotyped elements : a feud between a peaceful family of peasants and a powerful 
bully enjoying strong  connections with the local administration leading to the almost 
 complete annihilation of the former by the  latter’s Mafia-like clan. Among the details 
of spectacular violence that inundated the public media, the most revolting was the 
high numbers of victims : nine in the 18th century case that was turned into a novel, 
twelve in the Wang Weiqing case, the latter including six  children aged between two 
and thirteen, as well as two women. Both of these blood feuds only turned into legal 
cases because one single victim managed to survive, and sought justice in the courts. 
In the real case well as in the fictional account, this became the starting point of a 
long odyssey, strewn with ambushes organised by the powerful and influential bully, 
until the nearly-dead plaintiff met his or her savior in the guise of a ‘Clear Sky’, an 
upright and benevolent mandarin who received the  complaint and  confronted the 
villain. As a happy denouement of the fictional plot, the feud is eventually reversed 
when the villain is executed by lingchi, his kin and followers  condemned to death or 
exile, his wealth  confiscated and given to the victim in  compensation.
In such cases, the legal penalty strikingly mirrored the circumstances of the 
crime, the State  committing a familicide in a bout of retributive justice. This was the 
only category of crimes for which lingchi sentences met broad popular  consensus. 
The legitimacy of the State was enhanced when it redressed the abuses of the local 
gentry, and repressed feuds by turning their own methods against them. For this type 
of crime, public opinion and popular  culture undoubtedly supported the  State’s effort 
to use terror as deterrence.
20 Spence (1979, pp. 89-98).
21 See Carlitz (2007, pp. 234-257).
22 A sketch of the Wang Weiqin case appears in the introduction of Brook, Bourgon, Blue (2007).
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There is enough evidence to establish that the use of lingchi could not be ascribed 
solely to the repression of revolts, even though this  component was always present 
and could become overwhelming depending on time and location. Even taking 
into account the potential flaws of our data, it seems reasonable to argue that the 
majority of lingchi sentences were not pronounced against rebels or armed bandits, 
but against parricides. Throughout the period under examination, revolts account for 
hardly one third, while parricides account for more than half of the lingchi sentences, 
and familicides for ten percent  combined with 1.5% of “atrocities”. However, 
revolts and bandits are dominant for a longer period, when we  combine the reigns of 
Kangxi, Qianlong, Jiaqing and Tongzhi, i.e. 155 years out of 261, while parricides 
are dominant only at the beginning (under Shunzhi) and, more preeminently, at the 
end (under Guangxu), whose thirty years’ reign saw more than 40% of all lingchi 
sentences. Therefore, the predominance of parricides over revolts is established in 
the very last decades of the empire. In other words, it seems safe to infer a shift from 
a revolt-focused lingchi toward a parricide-focused lingchi during the 19th century. 
This shift occurred in the 1820s, if we take seriously the striking similarity between 
 Daoguang’s and  Guangxu’s pie-charts. To explain this shift, let us first  consider of 
the case of revolts, to turn to parricides next.
LINGCHI AS RESTORATION OF PUBLIC ORDER 
The idea that lingchi was devised mainly for repressing rebellions and bandits 
is firmly grounded in famous historical events, such as the dreadful fate of famous 
Taiping leaders. Our data include eloquent examples of that kind, most notably the 
repression of a revolt led by Buddhist Bonzes, whose  chief was called Snow Field 
(Xueye). It took place on the sixth year of Kangxi (1667), when the reign was still 
under the regency of Oboi, two years before he was tried and imprisoned by the 
young Emperor. This was a period of violent  conflict among the ruling elite. Oboi had 
the entire clan of one of his co-regents executed, a fate that came to haunt him and 
his kin some years later. This background might account for the merciless treatment 
of Snow Field partisans, of whom nothing is known otherwise. The memorial to the 
Board of Punishments reads :
The Governor General of Shanxi and Shaanxi provinces and other places, 
 concurrently in charge of military affairs and logistics, vice-president at the 
Ministry of War, and Censor Lü Chongling respectfully reports in re : the rebelled 
monk has surrendered. 
Your Servant has under his  control the  chief rebel, the monk Snow Field, who 
 connived with Li Faming et al. for printing fake seals and spread libels full of 
absurd ideas and foolhardy bravadoes. Your servant has proceeded to interrogations 
and established that Snow Field was the vicious head of a “Complot of Sedition”, 
punished by dismemberment according to the Law. Those who plotted with him 
for faking seals and spreading libels, that are [the monk] Illuminating Light and 
ten others who followed the rebellion and received the libels, as well as Zhou 
Shaofeng and thirteen others, each being found guilty of participating to a plot 
of rebellion, all of them (i.e. 27 persons), without distinction between leaders 
and followers, are according to the Law,  condemned to death by dismemberment. 
There has been no  contestation of the sentence. As for those who were aware 
of the situation, who  concealed the prohibited items, or deliberately let escape 
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[prisoners ?], namely Wang Sanye and four others, as well as the members of 
the family of the  chief rebel such like Qi Fengxi and twelve others, they are all 
 condemned to decapitation. (Here follows a list of accessories, sentenced to 
various non-capital punishments) The wives and the  children of the criminals are 
all, according to the law,  confiscated (ruguan)23, as well as their wealth and lands, 
with specifications detailed in the appended folios.24
This harsh sentence reveals some salient characteristics of lingchi execution 
against rebels, which can be sketched out as follows :
– Collective incrimination  conforming to legal key-terms in the statute and sub-
statute : “all of them, without distinction between leaders and followers” (jie, 
bu fen shoucong). Here, the abnormally high number of leaders  condemned 
to dismemberment suggests that the rebellion was  considered a serious 
threat for the dynasty, although the Bonze Snow Field and his unfortunate 
 companions left no other trace in the records.
–  combination of lingchi for the main  culprits and decapitation for accessories, 
with exposure of the head for both categories ;
– ‘chain indictment’ (lianzuo) of relatives and neighbors who were supposedly 
aware of the plot but did not denounce the plotters to the authorities ;
– Derived penalty for wives and  children – slavery, castration for males, or 
even death, deportation and ‘ confiscation’ (ruguan) for females, meaning that 
they became State slaves. 
This case is singular because of the high number of lingchi sentences in proportion 
to other derived penalties. In cases that posed much more serious threats for the 
dynasty, like the capture of the Taiping general Shi Dakai and his troops in 1863, a 
greater number of people were executed, but two thirds of the rebels were pardoned, 
one third beheaded, and only Shi Dakai was dismembered. This great rebellion of 
the mid-19th century might well mark the end of the use of lingchi against grave 
political crimes. Under the Guangxu reign, the share of “revolts” in the pie chart is 
the smallest during the Qing period, with 22%. Moreover, most of these “revolts” 
were in fact armed banditry, which became endemic throughout the empire at the 
turn of the 20th century. It is worth noticing that none of the modern revolutionaries 
who plotted an armed coup to topple the late Qing were  condemned to lingchi ; 
all died in fighting, or were beheaded when captured. The same can be said of the 
Boxers, whose presumed leaders and supporters were all beheaded, mostly under 
pressure from the Western Powers.25
Therefore, it seems reasonable to infer that the “lingchi against great rebellion” 
with its apparatus of mass terror, collective incriminations and serial executions, 
made its last round in the suppression of the Taiping, the Nian and Muslims rebels 
in the 1860s, and then almost disappeared over the last thirty years of the Qing. The 
dramatic increase of the lingchi sentences during this period is entirely due to the 
23 For the wives and  children of the  condemned ‘being  confiscated’ meant to be deported and reduced 
to slavery.
24 Neige daku, Archives of the Grand Secretariat, ‘Basic material’ (jiben ziliao) 065912-001.
25 On the Boxers’ execution, see Hevia (2003) ; and Bourgon (2012a).
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increase of the parricides, accounting for more than 70% of the total, as the pie chart 
clearly shows.
As shown in table d., the category of “revolts”, banditry included, represents little 
less than one third of the lingchi sentences for the entire period, a proportion that had 
fallen to 15% in the last decades of the Qing. By  contrast, parricides represent more 
than half of lingchi cases for the entire period, with more than two thirds occurring 
during the last decades. For every rebel dismembered for challenging public order, 
two or three rebellious  children or wives were dismembered for breaching the family 
hierarchy in the household.
LINGCHI USED FOR RESTORING HIERARCHICAL ORDER
WITHIN THE FAMILY
Parricide does not exist as a legal  concept, and there is no Chinese word for it.26 
Our category is a  compound of various crimes labeled and listed in distinct articles 
of the Qing code. Practically, lingchi sentences for “parricide” split into a dozen of 
sub-categories in our chart (see appendix 2, table d. and related pie chart), which can 
be outlined as follows, in order of decreasing frequency :
Murder or attempt against : percent of total parricide
1. Husband by his wife (viricide)  25
2. Seniors-elders (zunzhang) by younger relatives  20.5
3. Father  18
4. Mother  17
5. Household Head by slaves or hired servants   7.5
6. Mixed cases  13
Total 100
Greek tragedy, Roman Law, and Freudian psychology taught us to  construe 
‘parricide’ primarily as the murder of a father by his son, or secondarily of a mother 
by one of her  children. In Qing China however, parricide was a much broader 
category, involving distant relatives, which includes murder or attempted murder 
by slaves and servants against the household head. The killing of a parent  comes 
only in third and fourth places, after offences against ‘seniors-elders’ (zunzhang). 
The category covering  conflicts between domestic slaves and their master has the 
lowest number throughout the period, nearly disappearing under the Guangxu reign 
(just 4 cases recorded, or less than 1%). Yet this was very different by the beginning 
of the Qing, as we will see below. Most striking is the prevalence of spousal killing, 
where “offences against husband”  comes in the first place with 25% of lingchi. The 
“parricide”, in Qing China, was primarily a wife killing her husband, or “viricide”.
The statistics reveal significant changes throughout the Qing period. Under 
Shunzhi, in the mid-17th century, the killing of a master by one or more domestic 
slaves was still the most important category of lingchied parricides, accounting for 
47% of all such executions, ahead of the viricides, which already surpassed 40%. 
Master killings recede gradually along the Qianlong and Jiaqing eras (with 7% and 
26 See Bourgon (2012b).
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4%, respectively), and drop to less than 1% over the last thirty years of the Qing 
under Guangxu. During the same years, viricides reach their peak, with almost one 
third of the “parricides” (31%), and almost one quarter (22.5%) of all the lingchi 
sentences. Inasmuch as lingchi sentences reflect the inner  conflicts in the household, 
there is a clear shift from slave-against-master killings toward a wife-against-
husband killings, while other parricides do not show any striking change.
The sex ratio of the  condemned people is highly unusual when  compared 
with studies of other parts of the world, where most executions  concern men, in 
an approximate proportion of 10 to 20 men for one woman.27 In Qing China, of 
1140 persons  condemned to lingchi, 210 were registered as women, 929 as men, 
and 59 were of unspecified gender ; this means that women represented 18.5% of 
the lingchi sentences. This is in itself a remarkable proportion for the harshest form 
of punishments. Moreover, the proportion of women increases sharply during the 
late 19th century : starting with 31.5% of women under Shunzhi, the ratio falls to 
2.4% under Kangxi, and remains between 10 and 15% for the 18th and most of 19th 
century, with a striking, although erroneous, record showing no woman executed 
under Xianfeng and Tongzhi. Then  comes the horrendous last thirty years, with 114 
women out of 446 lingchi sentences, or 25.6%. Of course, this overrepresentation 
of women is a direct  consequence of the prevalence of parricides over the other 
categories of lingchi sentences, and of the prevalence of the ‘viricides’ in the 
category of parricides. This double prevalence is overwhelming under Shunzhi and 
Guangxu, the first and the last reign of our period.
In short, lingchi was increasingly used to repress ‘private  conflicts’ within the 
family rather than revolts, banditry, and other ‘public crimes’. Among family crimes 
the one most frequently punished with lingchi was the viricide, the killing of a 
husband by his wife. During the last thirty years of the Empire, one in four ‘great 
criminals’ sentenced to the harshest punishment was a woman who had killed her 
husband or another ‘superior relative’.28
SPREADING DETERRENCE :
THE SPATIAL REPARTITION OF LINGCHI IN THE QING EMPIRE
Thus far, lingchi as a means of mass deterrence has been evoked in its theoretical, 
qualitative, and quantitative aspects. The crucial issue remains how deterrence was 
 conveyed in practice from the centers of State power toward the provinces and 
local  communities. Capital executions, notably those applying the harshest forms 
of violence, involve a particular relationship between the center and the provinces 
or the non-Han marches of the empire (Mongolia, Tibet, Xinjiang). They suggest 
regional peculiarities which our data leads us to capture. 
This is the most challenging issue, however. First, the flaws in the data that 
obscured changes over time pose even more serious obstacles when we turn to the 
distribution between regions. Major differences set apart the eighteen provinces of 
27 Women represent less than 10% of the executed in 18th century London, according to Gatrell (1994, 
p. 8) ; Richard Evans (1996), give similar rates for Germany, apart from bouts of repressive fury 
against witches, and later against infanticide mothers in the mid-18th century.
28 This squares with James  Lee’s observations that “le seul ‘supérieur’  contre lequel se dressaient mas-
sivement les femmes était leur mari”, see Lee (1991, p. 127).
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China proper from the immense crescent of Manchurian, Mongolian, Turkestan and 
Tibetan steppes and mountains that were incorporated through the Manchu  conquest 
of China. Apart from the well-known and persistent differences in climatic  conditions, 
population density, ethnic  composition, etc., they  constituted two different worlds 
in terms of institutions and rules. Chinese provinces were ruled for centuries by 
the imperial administration, and submitted to codified law and centralized judiciary. 
The outer margins were left to their own aristocratic elites, under the initially loose, 
but gradually tighter and more intrusive supervision by a special administration, 
the Court for Ruling the Frontier-Marches (Lifanyuan). Although the majority of 
its personnel  consisted of non-Han, mainly Mongolian, origin, this Court tended to 
promote the Chinese way of regulation, codified law, and harsh punishments. But 
this general statement does not explain why Tibet had almost no lingchi sentences, 
while Mongolia and Manchuria have the highest rate of lingchi executions per capita, 
although all three were under the jurisdiction of the Lifanyuan. One of the aims of 
this research project is to gain a clearer understanding on how the legal and judicial 
 components of the imperial state functioned as a coherent system.
The second problem deals with the population. For an evaluation of the 
effectiveness of deterrence in any given area, examining the numbers of executions is 
not enough ; an estimation of the size of the population is needed, in order to calculate 
a ratio between the two figures. There is much uncertainty about population figures 
for each province during the Qing. For this project we had to rely on data found 
in Chinese books with relevant information despite their drawbacks and possible 
inaccuracies.29 We also had to deal with two different sets of figures which were 
hardly  compatible : on the one hand, the population in vast areas numbering millions 
or tens of millions ; on the other hand, 1,140 individuals executed over 261 years in 
the whole empire, with two or three dozen people at most for a given province. The 
ratio can measure the toll of the penalty on the total population – very small indeed. 
If we focus, not on the executed, but on possible onlookers, the ratio can hint at the 
deterrence effect, once we take into account those elements impossible to quantify, 
such as the ‘media coverage’ of the event : its advertising prior to execution, the 
publicizing and staging of the execution itself, and, more importantly still, the 
memory of it as kept or emphasized by oral or written accounts and narratives. 
Admittedly, local memories can vary significantly according to  cultural and social 
factors, but it seems safe to suppose that the ratio of lingchi executions per habitant 
for a given period has an immense impact on this memory, a basic ingredient of 
deterrence. But what is the time span for this kind of memory when such deterrence 
effect loses its impact ? We used imperial reigns like Guangxu, which is  convenient 
for designating the last thirty years of the empire. But for the sake of  comparison, we 
cut the periods into twenty-year blocks, presuming that this was the ‘generation that 
witnessed or heard about’ any particular execution30. We took the average number 
of the population reported for each of the periods of twenty years, and calculated 
the ratio that resulted in six categories, ranging from 1 lingchi sentence for less than 
500,000 inhabitants, to 1 lingchi sentence for more than 1,250,000 inhabitants, every 
twenty years (see maps c, d, e). 
29 Zhao, Xie (1984) ; Cao (2001).
30 Here we took example on recent studies of executions in modern and pre-modern Europe : Gatrell 
(1994) ; Evans (1996) ; Bastien (2011).
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We start with a rather fragmentary framework for the first two decades 1644-
1663, due to the lack of data for many provinces. At the dawn of the dynasty, when its 
grip on the Chinese territory was still uncertain, lingchi sentences were  concentrated 
in the centers of power : Zhili province, the metropolitan area centered on Beijing ; 
and Manchuria, that is in fact Shengjing – Moukden under its Manchu name – which 
was the original capital of the Qing and kept after the  conquest of China as part of 
its institutional and jurisdictional functions to the exclusive usage of the Manchus. 
The high rate of Gansu deals either with Muslim resilience that was to influence the 
province in the following centuries, or more likely with the gradual involvement of 
the dynasty in Mongolian rule in the northern border. The latter cannot be  confirmed, 
since we have no figures for Mongolia proper. At this first stage, the high rates of 
lingchi sentences are seen in the Northern region that was directly under the rule 
of the  conquerors, while central China reveals lower rates ; for the South and West 
there are no data. As will be shown further on the nature of the crimes punished with 
lingchi, there is no indication of rebellious attitudes of these Northern regions, since 
“parricide”, not “revolt”, was the most targeted crime.
The map for the two decades, 1728-1747 shows a very  contrasted picture, with 
high rates of lingchi sentences in the South-Western regions (Yunnan, Sichuan, 
Guizhou) singularized by their many ‘ethnic minorities’ and a strong Muslim 
 component in the population. As the “nature of the crime” will show below, these 
are rebellious regions already at this time – the years of the end of Yongzheng and 
the start of Qianlong rules – and this is  confirmed in our second time-unit : the map 
for 1770-1789 shows high rates of lingchi sentences in Yunnan-Guangxi-Sichuan, 
and also the adjacent Hubei and Hunan, all regions where the White Lotus rebellion 
originated, which drained armies and finances of the late Qianlong and early Jiaqing 
reigns. On the South-Eastern coast, Fujian province and its dependence of Taiwan, 
reveal high rates, mostly explained by feuds and banditry. But the most striking are 
the high incidents in the ‘non-Han’ Northern and Western vast crescent  comprising 
Manchuria, Mongolia, and Xinjiang. The grim honor of being the areas that saw the 
most incidents of lingchi goes to these three areas under Daoguang (1821-1851), 
and Guangxu, up to  lingchi’s abolition in 1905. The blind spot in the middle of the 
century prevented us from verifying whether the Taiping, Nian and other rebellions 
augmented the rates of lingchi sentences in the regions which were most affected. 
One notes, however, that regions where the Taiping originated, like Guangxi, and the 
regions where they spread, like Jiangsu, Anhui Zhejiang, and the regions where the 
rebels fled and tried to entrench, like Sichuan and Guizhou, saw higher incidents of 
lingchi. The high rates in Guizhou are partly explained by the recurrent revolts of the 
Miao. The clearest case of all is  Xinjiang’s, the Chinese Turkestan with its original 
populace of Uyghurs, prone to rebellion and separatism such as the independent 
khanate with Russian support. Here, as we will see, lingchi sentences have been a 
tool for repressing and deterring separatism.
The impact of rebellions on the occurrences of lingchi sentences would need 
further research. However, the category of “revolts” makes for less than one third of 
the total number for the whole period, and much less still during the last decades that 
followed the great rebellions. If insurgent spirit and deeds were targeted in places 
like Xinjiang, Guizhou or Yunnan, this is but one aspect of a more  complex picture, 
as shown in our last category of documents : maps indicating the nature of crimes 
that were predominant in the lingchi sentence pronounced in each province (see 
maps f, g, h).
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LOCALIZING CRIMES TARGETED BY LINGCHI SENTENCES
The last three maps all show a sharp  contrast between two categories : 
1. Provinces where “parricides” are overwhelmingly prevalent, with at least 40% 
of the sentences ; 2. Province where “revolts” are the most targeted crimes, with at 
least 40% of the sentences. For the whole period (map f), category 1 is dominant in 
all the Northeastern region from Manchuria, Mongolia, and Zhili, the metropolitan 
province, to the lower Yangzi provinces of Jiangsu and Zhejiang, throughout the 
central provinces, like Anhui, Hubei, down to the Hunan and West to Sichuan. The 
second category, where “revolts” is the main course of lingchi sentences forms a 
peripheral arc from the Southeastern coastal provinces of Fujian and Guangdong, up 
to the North-western Xinjiang, including the ethnically instable Yunnan, Guizhou, 
and Xizang, that is Tibet. Close to Xinjiang, Gansu has an even greater proportion 
of “revolts” than expected for a province where an important Muslim minority 
periodically revolted well before initiating the great Hui rebellion of the 1860s. The 
adjacent Shaanxi presents a similar picture. 
Thus a  contrast appears between a Southern and Western ‘outer’ China on the 
one hand, where lingchi was mainly a tool for repressing or deterring rebellions 
and banditry, and a Northern, Eastern and Central China on the other hand, where 
“parricides” were the main target. These two Chinas are highly unequal in population 
and density given that the Chinese population is  concentrated in the Eastern Coastal 
provinces and in some central provinces like Hubei or Sichuan, while the peripheral 
areas are sparsely populated. The prevalence of “parricides” over “revolts” in our 
data reflects this difference in demographic weight, which should not lead us to 
overlook the importance of the spatial dimension. If “revolts” amounted to less than 
one third of the lingchi sentences for the whole empire, they mostly occurred in the 
vast border areas with mixed and unruly populations, which form buffer marches 
of great geo-strategic importance for the Empire. In such regions, lingchi was 
undoubtedly the emblematic manifestation of imperial supremacy, or the tool for 
its restoration, in other words the State terror device that the term  conveys in the 
Western literature.
For most of the provinces of ‘inner China’, however, lingchi was imposed not to 
affirm imperial supremacy or restore public order, but to restore local and familial 
order. As for familicides, their general progression, as mentioned above, increased 
from around 7% to nearly doubling in the last decades of the Qing, as well as their 
permanence in local life. Geographically, lingchi sentences for familicides are in 
greater proportion in Northern and Central China : around 45% in Manchuria, 50% 
in Anhui, 30% in Shanxi, over 20% in Zhili. In the unruly Yunnan province, lingchi 
sentences are equally shared between parricides, revolts, and familicides. There are 
stunning bursts of “atrocities”, in Zhejiang or Fujian, meaning that local  conflicts 
lead to inhumane  conducts, such as the maiming of corpses or dismembering alive, 
with statistically significant frequency. Given that parricides were already a major 
cause of lingchi from the beginning of the dynasty, the progression of familicides 
appears as a major change, which seems to  complement the decline in revolts 
and banditry. Under the Qing, and particularly in the last decades, lingchi was 
increasingly employed to deter dominant lineages or local bullies from vanquishing 
their opponents by exterminating them with their kin, and thus maintain at least the 
simulacra of peace and order at the local level.
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The data do not allow us to go further in the geographical analysis. As limited 
as our survey is at the present stage, it hints at a penal typology of provinces, which 
would help restitute its spatial dimension to the legal system.
SOME TENTATIVE  COMPARISONS WITH EUROPE 
How should we assess the dismemberment of 1140 people over 250 years, with 
a frequency of around five incidents per year ? Do these numbers  confirm that China 
lavishly resorted to ‘cruel punishments’, as Westerners would assert increasingly 
vociferously from the mid-19th century ? How does the Chinese practice of execution 
 compare with the equivalents of the Western countries in the same period ?
The  comparison is not easy. The first difficulty is that reliable and regular data 
are hard to find prior to the mid-19th century except on a very small scale : covering 
one city or town, or at best a whole province. Since the judicial systems of Europe 
were not centralized to the same degree as the Chinese, historians have to piece 
together scattered information to reach general estimation on the execution rate 
in England or France. The second difficulty deals with the quality, rather than the 
quantity, of the data : the type of execution and the categories of targeted crimes in 
the West do not coincide with the Chinese ones. For instance, it has been calculated 
that around 35,000 death sentences were pronounced in England and Wales between 
1751 and 1800, of which about 7,000 were actually executed. These figures cannot 
be  compared directly with our 1,140 lingchi cases, since the latter number refers 
only to the particular form of penalties, which occurred much less frequently than 
‘ordinary’ capital punishments. A sound  comparison could be made only with a 
general account of all the capital sentences and executions in China, a figure that 
would be  considerably higher than our present data. Producing such statistics is 
perfectly feasible through a systematic survey of the judicial archives kept in Beijing 
and Taipei, but it would require much more time and manpower than we have been 
able to summon until now. 
If  comparing lingchi sentences with the general statistics of death penalties 
in Europe is not feasible, can we attempt a  comparison between lingchi and the 
forms of particularly cruel executions in Europe ? Indeed, it is tempting to  compare 
lingchi to the French écartèlement, the emblematic tortured agony used against those 
 convicted of lèse-majesté that Foucault famously – and wrongly – presented as the 
epitome of death penalty in pre-modern Europe, or to the English quartering, which 
was reserved to public enemies guilty of great subversion or high treason.31 The 
problem here is that these types of penalties were extremely rare, with no more 
than one or two dozen incidents found during the 17th and 18th centuries in Western 
Europe. As a penalty for lèse-majesté, parricide, blood feuds, individual acts of 
atrocity as well as revolt or armed banditry, lingchi is yet not  comparable with the 
harshest and most spectacular punishments of Europe.
In fact, there is one specific type of punishment in Europe that allows 
 comparisons with lingchi : the wheel. Under the two different forms it was practiced 
in Germany – to be broken alive with a heavy cartwheel – and in France – to be 
31 See the famous description of Damiens’ écartèlement in Foucault (1977) and its critique in Friedland 
(2012, p. 2013).
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broken alive with a bar while tied on the wheel – this punishment exhibited many 
similarities with lingchi. The punishment targeted the most heinous criminals, such 
as bandit ringleaders, serial murderers, parricides, and other  culprits of atrocious 
acts. Moreover, the ‘breaking’ and ‘slicing’ process were very  comparable in their 
operations and significances : the methodical destruction of the  criminal’s body was 
aimed at symbolizing the eradication of the evil and at inspiring awe and fear to 
the spectators. We have no statistical data on wheel executions, equivalent to our 
lingchi data. Yet a recent work of synthesis provides certain elements of  comparison. 
Benoît Garnot, an outstanding historian of justice in France, has gathered together 
figures from different jurisdictions to reach a  conclusion of “an average of two 
hundreds death penalty per year for the whole kingdom of France (0.74 per 100,000 
inhabitants)” during the second half of the 18th century. It is a figure that must be 
decreased by “at least one third”, to account for pardons,  contumacies, etc. So we 
are left with a general estimation of around 140 criminals executed per year in mid-
18th century France.32 So much for death penalties of all kinds. Garnot has also 
estimated the proportion of tormented executions, in particular “the breaking alive 
on the wheel”. In 18th century Burgundy, the “wheel is decided for one quarter of all 
the  condemned”, and this rate increased as time went by ; “at the end of the reign of 
Louis XV, the inflation of the tormented death penalties ( l’inflation des supplices) 
seems to be the rule here and there, to be decreased later”. In Provence, for instance, 
the “breaking on the wheel” rose to 53% between 1761 and 1770, with a peak of 
72% between 1781 and 1790. On the basis of  Garnot’s calculation, one can infer that 
“breaking on the wheels” represented at least one quarter, more likely one third, of 
the total number of executions in the second half of the 18th century. Therefore, it is 
easy to deduct that, among the 140 criminals who were executed each year over the 
second half of 18th century France, between 35 and 45 were “broken on the wheel”.33 
If these figures are  compared with the 60 years of the Qianlong reign (1736-1796), it 
would result in more than 2,000 deaths by the wheel, almost twice the total amount 
of lingchi we have found for the whole Qing period. Of course, these approximate 
figures should not be extrapolated. But they suggest that the use of lingchi was not 
more frequent than the use of the wheel, in an empire much bigger in size and more 
populous than France. Interpreted strictly as legal repression and deterrence of the 
most heinous crimes, the reign of Qianlong may not have been any more ‘cruel’ than 
the reigns of Louis XV or Louis XVI ; but of course, all this depends on how far the 
present sample is representative of the lingchi sentences executed under the Qing. 
This can only be  confirmed or disproved by further research. 
32 Garnot (2009, pp. 479-480). 
33 According to Pieter Spierenburg (1984, p. 213), there were 40 executions by breaking on the wheel 
in Amsterdam between 1651 and 1750, i.e around 0,4 per year. Estimating the average population 
to around 200,000, this makes a rate twice higher than in France, and much higher than the rate of 
lingchi in China according to our data. 
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CONCLUSION
Lingchi was from its origin an anomaly in Chinese law : belatedly and imperfectly 
codified, loosely and expeditiously handled, excluded from revision procedure. It 
was applied to criminals for their presumed crimes and attempted crimes without 
 consideration of their intent, in  complete  contradiction with the sound principles of 
the regular legal system. An enclave of extraordinary law from the outset, lingchi 
had been shaped for the defense of the Confucian “Three bonds” (sangang), in 
which the two last bond – the father-son and the husband-wife relationships – are 
modeled on the first, the sovereign-subject bond. For centuries, the assimilation of 
regicide and parricide that authoritative  commentators read into the Annals, one of 
the Five Classic of the Confucian tradition, was mainly a doctrinal justification of 
political power. Those who challenged the dynasty or the public order by rebellion 
or treason  committed an attempt of regicide-parricide, and thus were doomed to 
lingchi and the extermination of their clan.34 An anomaly from a legal point of view, 
lingchi  conformed to a logic that recommended using mass terror against public 
enemies. The primary interest of our data is to show the dramatic shift of a mass 
terror device from the public to the private sphere. Under the Qing, less than one 
third of the lingchi sentences targeted crimes threatening State power while more 
than half targeted crimes  committed within the family, with 15 to 40%, depending on 
regions, aimed at limiting the extermination of rival families.35 In the last decades of 
the empire, lingchi was still used as deterrence against rebels in remote border areas, 
but in most of the Chinese provinces it targeted  chiefly rebellious  children or wives, 
as well as local bullies prone to kill any opponent together with his family.
Even at this initial stage, our investigation in penal geography promises an 
important outcome in charting out for the spatial dimension of law. The Qing had a 
well-developed legal system, highly systematic in labeling crimes and apportioning 
punishments ; but the system could live and grow only by its interrelation with local 
realities through a  complex institutional network that is most aptly seized when 
restored in its spatial dimension. The Qing code provides us with only a list of crimes 
liable to lingchi, but in order to know what kind of crimes were effectively targeted 
by lingchi, we have to delve into the archival cases, and into their spatial repartition 
and evolution through time. Beyond the sheer figures about harsh punishments, and 
the  comparisons of the level of cruelty between China and Europe that these data 
seem to reveal, a key interest of such an enquiry is to map the penal agenda of the 
State throughout its territory. The present data and the maps we drew from them 
as well as the associated analyses are intended as an invitation to further and more 
ambitious research into the central archives in Beijing and Taipei, as well as in local 
archives that become more accessible each year. 
Figures are cold abstraction, however, which need to be fleshed out by this 
illustration of the subject most targeted by the harshest penalty, the arch-enemy in 
the late Qing : the wife who plotted the killing of her husband with the help, or 
under instigation, of her lover. Here she is, as shown in an illustrated handbook 
on the “Five Punishments” that circulated in the 1900s (see appendix 3), logically 
34 On the etymological and legal meanings of lingchi, see Brook et al. (2008, chapter 3) ; Bourgon 
(2012b).
35 Striking cases of ‘familial crimes’ have been collected and aptly  commented by Lauwaert (1999).
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subjected to lingchi. This beautiful, desirable young woman languidly  contemplates 
her severed limbs, while her lover is waiting to be beheaded at the background. In 
all its suggestive crudity, this illustration  comes, not from a popular titillating novel, 
but from a stern legal handbook.36 For a reader trained by reading Bodde & Morris, 
and so many authors, to face violent rebels and bandits, it  comes as a disconcerting 
dismay. One feels like a moviegoer who expected to watch Spartacus and is shown 
The Postman Always Rings Twice instead. The dismay is instructive, however. 
The fact that instead of the Great Traitor – Chiyou, the Archetypal Rebel who was 
defeated and dismembered by the Founding Yellow Emperor in the great myth on 
the origins of the Chinese civilization – we find a fragile, though unfaithful and 
murderous wife is like a parody of the Confucian great project of total governance. 
It is as though the majestic progression schemed in the Great Study : Governing 
the Self, Ruling the Family, Pacifying the World, had shrunk back, as though the 
chaos that had shaken the State to its foundation had gained the very core of the 
family, the spousal couple, that was indeed to get through some turbulences in the 
century to  come. This is the threat that lingchi sentences were supposed to  conjure, 
a threat against the dogmatic foundation of the Confucian order, much more serious 
than social upheavals or political protests. This is, however, where Chinese Law 
originated its raison  d’être and dynamics and where its meaning and progress must 
be sought.
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a. The “archives of the Grand Secretariat” (neige daku  dang’an) include a collection 
the memorials sent by provincial authorities to the Central boards for revision 
and transmission to the emperor for all kinds of administrative affairs, among 
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which were capital cases. These archives are kept in Taipei, in the “Old Palace” 
(Gugong) Museum, where parts of the documents that were primarily in Beijing 
have been moved. Their digitalization provides us with 357 persons dismembered 
in 338 executions between 1644 and 1854.
b.  Judicial reviews of the Shenbao (or Shanghai News). The Shenbao was the first 
modern news journal in Chinese daily published in Shanghai from 1872 up to 
1949, with interruptions due to civil war and Japanese aggression. Right from the 
first year onward, the journal systematically reproduced abstracts of the ‘Beijing 
gazette’ (jingbao), an unofficial copy of official documents – mostly legal and 
judicial– issued by the central boards in Beijing. Until very recently, researchers 
had to use a facsimile of the original format, whose general layout made its 
reading quite laborious and a statistical surveys almost impossible. Its recent 
digitalization and online access has permitted to find accounts on 453 people 
executed in 453 executions between September 1872 and April 1905. 
c.  The “illicit sexual intercourse” were a part of the “Routine memorials of the 
Penal service of the Censorate” (xingke tiben). The sentence transmitted to the 
Board of Punishment were routinely reviewed and archived by a service of the 
Censorate specialized in penal affairs. This bureaucratic process has produced 
millions of documents now stored in the Archive n°1 at  Beijing’s Forbidden city. 
In recent years, the Institute of History and Philology of the Academia Sinica in 
Taiwan has copied important samples and made them available online. 
d.  Leading cases from the ‘Board of Punishments’ (Xingbu) part of the ‘Official 
administrative collected  compendium with cases and rules of the Great Qing’, 
(Qinding Da Qing huidian shili) covering the Guangxu reign (publ. 1899). 
This was a huge collection of all texts that  constituted the central services at 
the capital. The part devoted to the ‘Board of Punishments’ included the Qing 
code, and a selection of precedents or shili that were likely to be inserted into the 
code as sub-statutes or tiaoli, and thus become new laws enforced on a particular 
matter.
e.  The ‘Comprehensive  compendium of penal cases’ ( Xing’an huilan) is a huge 
collection of judicial materials, including cases adjudicated at the local level and 
transmitted to the ‘Board of Punishment’ by the provincial judiciaries as well as 
memoranda exchanged between services of the Board. The original collection in 
60 volumes covers around ten years from 1823 to 1834, and has been followed 
by many sequels and reprints up to the 1890s. Our cases are abstracted from a 
PDF version of the recent edition by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 
Institute of Legal Studies.
f.  The ‘Veracious registers’ (Shilu) is an official day-by-day record of the decisions 
taken by the Qing emperors in  connection with their ministers and subordinate 
services. There is one ‘Veracious register’ per reign, giving a total of ten for the 
Qing, all available in PDF and searchable with OCR devices. Death sentences 
reviewed by the emperor were cursorily registered therein. 
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2. Statistics and diagrams





Year count with 
“blank years”
Shunzhi (1644-1661) 54 3,0 18
Kangxi (1662-1722) 82 1,4 61
Kangxi blank year deducted 3,9 40 years deducted 
from 61
Yongzheng (1723-1736) 6 1,7 13
Qianlong (1737-1796) 236 3,6 59
Jiaqing (1797-1820) 176 7,7 23
Daoguang (1821-1851) 124 4,1 30
Xianfeng (1852-1861) 12 3,0 5 years deducted 
from 9
Tongzhi (1862-1874) 2 0,5 8 years deducted 
from 12
Guangxu (1875-1908) 446 13,5 33
Year unknown 2  
Whole period (1644-1905) 1140 4,4 261
Whole period minus 65 “blank years”  5,6 205
2.b. General trend of lingchi sentencing 1644-1905
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2.c. Four categories of lingchi sentences for eight Qing emperors reigns
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2.d. Share of lingchi sentences for each category of crimes (whole period)
Cause  Count share 
(%)
Revolts  369  32,4 
Familicides 124  10,9 
Atrocities 18  1,6 
Parricides (total)  629  55,2 
Nature of parricides Pv (viricide) 167  26,6 
 Pse (senior-elder) 128  20,3 
 Pm (mother) 110  17,5 
 Pf (father) 109  17,3 
 P (unknown) 55  8,7 
 Phh (household head) 48  7,6 
 Pc ( combined) :  
 P (father and mother) 6  1,0 
 P (father and household head) 1  0,2 
 P and revolt 2  0,3 
 P (viricide and senior-elder) 1  0,2 
 P (viricide and senior-elder and familicide) 1  0,2 
 P (viricide and father) 1  0,2 
TOTAL  1140  
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2.e. Nature of the parricides 
Nature of parricides for the whole period (1644-1905)
Nature of parricides : Shunzhi (1644-1662)
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Nature of parricides : Qianlong(1736-96)
Nature of parricides : Guangxu (1875-1905)
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3. Maps
3.a. Rate of lingchi sentences by province for 1644-1662
3.b. Rate of lingchi sentences by province in 1728-1747
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3.c. Rate of lingchi sentences by province, 1770-1789
3.d. Rate of lingchi sentences by province 1821-1850.
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3.e. Rate of lingchi sentences by province 1875-1905
3.f. Nature of the crimes leading to lingchi sentences in each province
for the whole period (1644-1905).
84 JÉRÔME BOURGON
3.g. Nature of the crimes leading to lingchi sentences in each province under 
Qianlong (1736-1796).
3.h. Nature of the crimes leading to lingchi sentences in each province under 
Guangxu (1875-1905).
